After their breakthrough success in the
2009 European elections, where they won two seats in Sweden ’s
delegation to the Parliament in Strasbourg ,
the world was awakened to the existence of the Pirate Party movement. In 2011, Germany ’s Pirates capitalised on disaffection
among Green, Free Democrat, and Left Party voters to win fifteen seats in Berlin ’s state
legislature. The Pirates have proved that those results were not one-off
flukes, and have in the last six weeks won seats in two more state
legislatures: four in Saarland and six
in Schleswig-Holstein. Tonight, the country’s largest state, North
Rhine-Westphalia, goes to the polls,
and the Pirates are consistently polling above the five-percent threshold
needed to win seats there.
The Pirates’ voter base indicates their status
as a party of the left. In Berlin
last year, their voters were disproportionately young, unemployed or
blue-collar, and switched to the Pirates from the SPD, the Greens, the Left
Party, or from not voting in the previous election. Geographically, their
support was highest in working-class suburbs in West Berlin (such as the
SPD-voting Spandau) or in East Berlin (such as
the Left Party-voting Marzahn-Hellersdorf), and in proletarian bohemian
strongholds in the city centre (such as the Green/Left Party Kreuzberg). The
classical liberal/centrist FDP, who suffered a huge drop in support, mostly
leaked votes to the CDU and the Greens, not to the Pirates – their base (mostly
middle-class Protestants: they’re referred to as ‘the party of doctors and
dentists’) aren’t the sort of people who instinctively oppose the recording
industry’s War On File-Sharing. In short, the Pirates’ support is found among
young, anti-system Germans who believe that the SPD and the Greens sold out to
the establishment long ago, and that the Left Party is too dominated by
septuagenarian ex-Stasi types to provide a dynamic alternative to the Big Four
parties.
The idea that being left-wing automatically
means favouring large, soulless, impersonal bureaucracies over the dynamism of
the free market is a) not true of everyone on the left and b) never was true
prior to the early twentieth century. The German experience is instructive in
this regard. In 1891, the Social Democratic Party published its Erfurt
Program, summarising its policy goals. It was produced against the backdrop
of the creation of a rudimentary welfare state by Bismarck ’s conservative government, which the
SPD labelled ‘state socialism’ (and they meant that term to be derogatory). Its
demands included biennial parliaments, the right to keep and bear arms, and an
elective judiciary, in addition to a few basic calls for economic regulation,
such as a forty-hour week, the abolition of child labour, and free health care.
These were too much, however, for Friedreich Engels, whose critique
of the program asked whether the regulation of such things as “the bar…medical
services…pharmaceutics, dentistry, midwifery, nursing, etc.” was “compatible
with the rejection of all state socialism.”
What happened, then, to the
left-libertarian spirit of the fin-de-siècle SPD? It died when the party
jettisoned its anti-war and anti-imperialist stance in the face of the
patriotic mobilisation which accompanied the First World War. It embraced the
statist ideas of British Fabian intellectuals, and like so many left-wing
parties around the world, came to view the wartime regulation of the economy as
a model for building socialism in peacetime. When the Keynesian Consensus
collapsed, it followed the rest of the global establishment left in diverting
its authoritarian instincts towards the nanny state and green Malthusianism. The
5-10% of left-wing Germans who now reject the SPD-Green bloc are doing exactly
the same thing that SPD voters did a century ago: supporting
left-libertarianism against Bismarckian state socialism. It isn’t too difficult
to make the case that if Marx and Engels were alive today, they would be among
them.
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