In the early decades of Australia’s
post-Federation history, one of the most common suggestions for constitutional
reform advanced by progressives (i.e., the ALP, Deakinite liberals, the
agrarian radicals of the early Country Party, feminists such as Vida Goldstein,
and quasi-republican nationalists such as John Boyd Steel) was the idea of
elective ministries. Instead of a prime minister commissioned by the
Governor-General (or Premier commissioned by a Governor) appointing her own
cabinet, each individual member of the executive would be voted on by the
entire parliament. The idea is similar to the way the Swiss legislature elects
its Federal Council, except that there the members cannot be removed mid-term.
Ministers would be personally responsible to the legislature, and would not
form a collective body expected to resign upon failure to secure supply, nor
would they be expected to resign if they disagreed with a decision reached by
the entire executive.
A similar idea would be to establish an
executive committee, with the same structure as other parliamentary committees.
Whichever party or coalition had a majority on the floor would have a majority
in the executive committee, but the opposition would be represented and
entitled to issue minority reports where it disagreed with the decisions of the
committee’s majority. This would be a modern-day update of how the French Committee
of Public Safety was supposed to work, had it not become the instrument of
Robespierre’s personal rule. The office of minister, with all its British and
monarchical overtones, would be abolished, and the entire executive committee
would directly oversee the executive branch.
The idea of an elective ministry was never
implemented, though it influenced the pre-Rudd practice of the ALP caucus
electing its front bench. A skeletal version has made an appearance in Britain
in recent years – the devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales, and the Six
Counties all elect their chief minister, who then appoints her cabinet. But the
original idea has been all but forgotten, and critics of the ‘elective
dictatorship’ of the Westminster system are focused on various other panaceas –
proportional representation, stronger parliamentary committees, and
bicameralism.
Recently, Julia Gillard was able to shore
up her floundering leadership by daring Kevin Rudd to challenge her in a
leadership ballot. When he shrunk from the challenge, almost all of her
ministers who supported him either resigned or were replaced. Effectively, this
means that as the forty-something percent of ALP MPs who support Rudd cannot
serve in the cabinet, Australia is currently ruled by the faction which
commands a slim majority of the caucus which holds 71 of the 150 seats in the
House of Representatives. The ability of the prime minister to use the
monarchical powers delegated to her (dissolving parliament, appointing and
dismissing ministers, etc.) has ensured that no Australian government has been
defeated on the floor of the House since Fadden’s in 1941, and none has been
defeated due to a back-bench rebellion since Bruce’s in 1929.
If the cabinet system were replaced with an
executive committee, the ALP would have 71/150ths of its seats, and the
pro-Rudd faction would receive its proportionate share of that tally. We might
evolve something like the American system, but without its increasingly
imperial and plebiscitary presidency. The distinction between private member’s
bills and government bills would vanish, and minority factions of the majority
party could combine with the opposition and cross-benchers to pass bills – as
has happened in the United States recently with Hurricane Sandy relief and the
Violence Against Women Act.
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